Introduction to excerpts from Lessons
Learned From 9/11: DNA
Identification in Mass Fatality
Incidents
GLENN R. SCHMITT*
On the 5th anniversary of the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center, the National Institute of Justice—the
research, development, and evaluation agency of the U.S.
Department of Justice—published a major report on the
identification of mass disaster victims using DNA analysis.
The report was prepared by the Kinship and Data Analysis
Panel, a multidisciplinary group of scientists assembled by
the National Institute of Justice to offer guidance to the New
York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner in the
identification of those who perished in the World Trade
Center.
Although Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA
Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents is designed primarily
to help the Nation’s crime laboratory directors respond to
future mass fatality disasters—be they natural disasters, large
transportation accidents, or terrorist events—a variety of
issues in the report concern the intersection of criminal
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justice and forensics, particularly as it relates to using DNA
analysis to identify victims when other identification methods
are not enough.
WHY DNA ANALYSIS?
DNA analysis is the newest of several methods used to
identify human remains. (Other methods of identification
include obvious physical attributes, such as birthmarks,
tattoos, medical implants, clothing and jewelry); forensic
anthropology; fingerprints; odontology; and radiology.) The
need to use DNA analysis also may occur when the condition
of human remains are fragmented and/or commingled due to
the type of event or the duration of the recovery effort. When
sufficient quantities of DNA from biological and “reference”
samples exist, DNA profiling can be uniquely identifying.
DNA identifications are made by comparing DNA
profiles from human remains to DNA profiles from reference
samples. There are several potential sources of reference
samples: (1) personal items used by the victim (for example,
a toothbrush, hairbrush, or razor) and banked samples from
the victim (for example, sperm or biopsy tissue that has been
stored in a medical facility); (2) biological relatives of the
victim (called “kinship samples”); and (3) human remains
previously identified through other methods or other
fragmented remains already typed by DNA.
THE FIRST 48 HOURS
The hours and days immediately following a mass fatality
incident are inevitably chaotic. Within the first 48 hours, a
laboratory director will likely be faced with a number of
potentially “competing” issues, including responding to
requests from elected officials, government agencies, the
media, the victims’ families, and the laboratory staff.
Decisions made during these first 48 hours largely will
determine the efficiency and efficacy of the DNA
identification effort. Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA

2006

Introduction to Lessons Learned From 9/11

15

Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents addresses some of
these decisions, including:


Are there sufficient people, resources, equipment, and
funding to support the effort?



What agencies/departments will interact with the
laboratory? Who are the points-of-contact?



Which agencies/departments will be in charge of
specific activities—for example, collecting reference
samples, collecting disaster samples, administration of
funding?



How and when will the laboratory director assess the
degree to which samples are compromised (e.g.,
fragmentation, commingling, degradation)?



How, when, and by whom will reference samples be
collected?



How will staff and resources be reorganized to handle
the ongoing casework and the increased casework due
to the mass fatality incident?



Who will be the point of contact with the media?



Will the laboratory outsource DNA testing? Which
testing? To whom?



How will progress in the DNA identification effort be
relayed to family members, elected officials, and the
media?



What will the laboratory’s policy be if there is a
situation in which the genetic relationship is not
consistent with the biological relationship reported by
the family?
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Other “policy-related” parameters of a mass fatality DNA
identification effort must also be established, such as:
HOW IMPORTANT IS DNA TO THE IDENTIFICATION
EFFORT?
The degree to which human remains are fragmented or
degraded determines the value of DNA analysis in the
identification process. Large body parts lend themselves to
identification by less costly methods, such as X-ray, dental
examination, and fingerprints. However, DNA analysis is the
only viable method for identifying severely fragmented or
degraded remains. Even when whole bodies are recovered,
DNA analysis still may be the best approach when materials
that are necessary for other methods of identification—for
example, dental records or verified body identification by
friends or relatives—are unavailable.
WILL EVERY PERSON OR EVERY FRAGMENT BE
IDENTIFIED?
The answer to this question frames the scope of the DNA
identification effort. Obviously, intact bodies will require
fewer testings than fragmented remains, although
decomposing bodies may not easily yield full profiles. For
example, in an airplane crash with 50 victims, in which each
victim’s remains are fragmented into many pieces, the
identification effort will end sooner if the goal is to identify
each victim, rather than each fragment of human remains.
Everyone—the public, the policymakers, and the laboratory
personnel—needs to understand the answer to the important
question: “When are we finished?”
If the policy is to identify all of the victims, DNA analysis
would stop as soon as the last victim is identified, which
means that some human remains may never be analyzed or
returned to the families. However, when the goal of the effort
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is the attempted identification of all fragments, the work of
the laboratory likely will be greater and take much longer.
It is important to consider that, if a mass fatality incident
is so large and devastating that it affects the psyche of a
community, a country, or the world, the scope of the
identification effort may be broadened to help acknowledge
the breadth of the emotional ramifications. After the 9/11
attacks, for example, the Mayor of New York City directed
the Office of Chief Medical Examiner to do everything
humanly possible to identify every fragment of human
remains. And fragmented remains found over five years later
were subjected to analysis for that reason.
WHAT IS THE MINIMUM FRAGMENT SIZE THAT
WILL BE IDENTIFIED?
Policies also need to be established at the beginning of the
effort that define “minimum fragment size” for DNA testing.
A policy that has as a goal “all remains tested” may mean that
many fragments may fail to yield results. In this situation, the
DNA effort would take longer and be more costly—and,
although families would be more likely to receive more of
their loved one’s remains, they may be unprepared for the
fragmentary condition of the remains or the length of time it
takes to identify them.
WHAT WILL BE THE IMPACT ON A LABORATORY’S
ROUTINE CASEWORK?
The impact of a mass fatality incident response on the
laboratory’s primary mission—processing routine, criminal
casework—must be considered. As resources are redirected
to a mass fatality identification effort, backlog and
turnaround times for regular casework are likely to increase.
Even though law enforcement officials and officers of the
court may support the laboratory’s role in a mass fatality
incident response, they may still expect their cases to be
completed in a timely manner.

18

Trends and Issues in Scientific Evidence

Vol. 1

CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY ISSUES
Most lawyers are familiar with traditional chain-ofcustody issues, including the handling of evidence and how it
is presented in the courtroom. In identifying victims of a
mass fatality incident through DNA, however, chain-ofcustody issues are multiplied exponentially due to the sheer
number of samples—human remains, personal reference
items, and samples from next of kin—needed to identify the
victims.
Although chain-of-custody issues impact nearly every
stage of a DNA identification effort, the collection of samples
may be the most critical and frequently overlooked. In the
urgency to identify the victims, there may be little attention
paid to how the remains are collected. Therefore, protocols
for chain-of-custody documentation in collecting evidence
and handling samples must be a part of a laboratory’s mass
fatality incident plan. This is important not only for scene
reconstruction and quality control, but also for any
subsequent legal proceedings.
One of the most important initial decisions that must be
made is whether to treat the incident as a humanitarian effort,
civil incident, or criminal matter. This decision will drive
chain-of-custody requirements. In a natural disaster, for
example, the identification effort is largely humanitarian:
identifying the victims so that their remains can be returned
to the families and a death certificate and other
documentation can be issued. However, when a mass fatality
results from criminal activity, the identification effort has
humanitarian and investigative components. In a criminal
matter, the medical examiner may be involved in identifying
the perpetrators and assisting with the law enforcement
investigation.
Chain-of-custody issues can be complicated by the size
and quality of the DNA from victims’ remains. For example,
environmentally harsh conditions at the incident site may
limit the quantity of typable DNA recoverable from human
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remains. Also, there may be a paucity of reference samples
from close biological relatives or from victims’ personal
effects. For example, airline passengers often travel with their
toothbrushes and hairbrushes, and these items may be lost or
destroyed in an airline disaster. Kinship samples may be
unavailable or scarce because the victim had few living
biological relatives or because the relatives are unable or
choose not to participate in the identification effort.
The chaotic environment at a mass disaster site can lead
to sample mix-ups. Careful planning must take place to
establish guidelines for collection, handling, and preservation
of all samples to ensure accuracy throughout the process. The
commingling of remains presents another potential problem.
After a remains sample is analyzed, the laboratory may
discover that it belongs to two or more individuals. The DNA
may show that the bone and tissue come from different
donors, as happened in World Trade Center (WTC), where
remains were severely compacted.
Documenting the chain of custody of personal effects
used as reference samples—for example, toothbrushes,
razors, medical biopsy samples, and clothing—can also
present challenges. For example, there may be inadvertent
reference-sample switching by bereft loved ones. Or there
may be name misspellings or unlinked nicknames associated
with the same last name. In addition, family members may
state with certainty that their missing relative was the only
one to have contact with a personal effect that is brought in
for DNA testing; but then, DNA analysis may show the
profiles of two or more persons, further complicating the
process. In some mass fatalities, such as a tidal wave,
personal effects belonging to victims can be lost or
contaminated at the site itself. Therefore, managing sample
collection and tracking in a controlled, documented fashion is
essential to a DNA identification process.
BEYOND CHAIN OF CUSTODY
Although “Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA
Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents” deals extensively
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with laboratory protocols that can ensure proper chain-ofcustody documentation, these form only one part of the
identification process. Potential legal ramifications can
extend far beyond traditional chain-of-custody procedures
and documentation. Other major issues are as wide-ranging
as dealing with the press, privacy, and working with an
advisory panel of experts and/or bioethicists, and a prudent
laboratory director will be ever-mindful of the potential for
civil action. Such litigation could arise out of
misidentification, release of information, control of remains,
and intellectual property assertions regarding the
development of new identification techniques. The report
offers guidance regarding the need for a laboratory director to
work closely with contracting officers and attorneys on issues
such as contracts, intellectual property rights, and privacy
issues, including the creation of a next-of-kin release policy.
There also are potential liability issues to consider if
consultants or volunteers are used. It may be advisable, for
example, to have consultants and volunteers sign a
confidentiality agreement, stating that no data or information
related to the DNA identification effort may be published or
conveyed to the media without prior written consent of the
laboratory director. Such an agreement might also state that
no personal information should be disclosed regarding the
victims, the state of the remains, or any other aspect of the
incident that the consultant or volunteer learns as a result of
working on the DNA identification effort. A comprehensive
confidentiality agreement can help protect the laboratory
from premature, unconfirmed reports and the victims’ loved
ones from insensitive divulging of gruesome details.
MANAGING EXPECTATIONS
As most lawyers know, “expectations”—held by a judge,
jurors, or the public—can play a role in any legal case,
including one that might arise after a mass fatality disaster
and the subsequent identification of victims. For example, a
laboratory director managing to a large DNA-based
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identification effort will likely encounter a host of new
constituents and all of them—the victims’ families, public
officials, the media, and the general public—will have
expectations about the technology of DNA analysis and a
timeline for DNA-based identifications. Lessons Learned
From 9/11: DNA Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents
addresses some of these concerns.
Although everyone likely will seek the same outcome—
the maximum number of identifications and the maximum
quantity of remains accurately returned to the family—their
priorities may not be the same. Elected officials, for example,
may focus on the speed of the identification process, whereas
the laboratory’s primary focus may be with the quality of the
collection and analysis processes. Although these goals are
not mutually exclusive, they may occasionally clash.
Also, as lawyers who have had to deal with DNA analysis
and evidence already know, the public—including public
officials and the media—knows little about the realities of
DNA identification analysis, popular television shows
notwithstanding. The public will have to be educated in order
to develop realistic expectations about the speed and power
of DNA testing, including the fact that some of the victims
and some of the remains may not be identified.
SPECIAL REQUESTS
It is possible that lawyers may be involved in requests for
special sample handling after a mass fatality event. The first
hours after a major incident will be emotionally charged, with
the possibility of many urgent requests that the laboratory
perform immediate DNA analyses. Requests for expedited
analyses may also occur later in the identification effort, if
new remains are recovered or more useful personal items or
relative references become available. In the World Trade
Center DNA identification, for example, the laboratory
frequently received instructions to collect and analyze
reference samples—and compare them to already analyzed
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DNA profiles in the hopes of making an identification—
within 24 hours or less.
MEDIA RELATIONS
Because DNA technology is of such interest to the public,
there are likely to be many DNA-related questions from the
media—and lawyers may play a variety of roles in media
relations and how information is given to the public.
Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA Identification in Mass
Fatality Incidents advises laboratory directors to be prepared
to answer questions such as:
 How many victims have been identified?
 Have you identified the terrorists?
 How much time until the work is finished? Why is it
taking so long?
 Will you be able to identify everyone? How many
victims will you be able to identify? Why can’t you
identify all of them?
 What is the condition of the remains?
In addition, the issue of commingled remains may be a
particularly sensitive one for families. And, the media may
focus on new or unusual technologies, seeking information
on their reliability, when they will be brought online, and
how many new identifications they will yield. In addition,
some reporters may want to “scoop” their competition and,
because of this and the pressure on them to meet short
deadlines, there often is insufficient time for a story to be
vetted as fully as the scientific community would like.
Unfortunately, some of what gets printed or broadcast may
contain errors. If this happens, the gulf between perception
and reality can create anxiety and confusion among the
victims’ families and the general public.
Most DNA laboratories will have no experience in
working with the families of victims of a mass fatality
incident. This report discusses the formation of family
assistance centers and hotlines—and contains a number of
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helpful forms, including the most recent version (in English
and in Spanish) of a brochure on the DNA identification
process that was distributed to victims’ families after the 9/11
attacks.
Mostly, the families of victims simply want information.
Most laypeople do not understand forensic identification
modalities, and DNA can seem especially mysterious. Often,
families do not know why they are being asked to provide
their loved one’s personal items or why the laboratory is
requesting DNA samples from relatives. Some families may
be concerned at what they perceive as the government asking
questions about their DNA or their relationship to a mass
fatality incident victim. Also, once DNA samples are
provided, families may not hear anything for days, weeks, or
even months, which can cause additional anxiety about the
government’s use of their DNA. The entire process can be
bewildering and frustrating to the families of victims, which
is why a laboratory’s policies regarding sample disposition,
privacy, and other personal information should be
communicated clearly and respectfully.
Other issues that lawyers may be involved in include
obtaining reference samples from a family member who was
estranged from a victim, or situations in which biological
relationships are discovered, upon DNA analysis, to be not as
reported. In such cases, it may be advisable to consult with a
bioethicist (see www.bioethics.net).
CONCLUSION
Through the President’s DNA Initiative, Advancing
Justice Through DNA Technology, a 5-year multi-million
dollar program, NIJ is committed to providing funding,
training, and assistance to assure that forensic DNA reaches
its full potential to solve crimes, protect the innocent and
identify missing persons (see www.dna.gov). Even before
NIJ published Lessons Learned From 9/11: DNA
Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents, we provided
guidance to officials who were involved in the identification
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of victims of the Southeast Asia tsunami (December 2004),
and of Hurricane Katrina (August 2005), a disaster that
revealed how any State or municipality can be overwhelmed
by the operational requirements of responding to a mass
fatality event.
As I said at the beginning of Lessons Learned From 9/11:
DNA Identification in Mass Fatality Incidents, it is only
through planning, training, and vigilant assessments of the
capabilities of our public forensic laboratories that laboratory
directors—and the policymakers who fund them—can
prepare for a mass fatality event. Only through diligent
planning can we ensure that our public resources are used as
efficiently as possible. I believe this report will help us
accomplish that mission.

